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torts doctrine of respondeat superior might shed some light on the majority's
underlying decision, to put the risk of an agency relationship on the principal
rather than an outsider. Among others, there are two social policy reasons
behind respondeat superior which may have been in the back of the Court's
mind.17 One is the ability of the master to control his servants as opposed to
the lack of control in an outsider. In the instant case, defendant was in a
better position to control his agent than was the plaintiff, even if this meant
finding a new agent. And secondly, the master, not the outsider, benefits by the
master-servant relationship. So too, a principal is benefited by being able to
do business through an agent instead of doing it in person. Because the agency
relationship is vital to our society it should be held effective whenever possible.
To penalize a person for depending on a relationship which, to all appearances,
exists, would substantially weaken the usefulness of agency law. Plaintiff, it
would seem, had no reason to doubt Cash's authority as an agent empowered
to receive notice of the outstanding equity. He therefore proceeded to do every-
thing he thought necessary to protect his interest. Thus, it is difficult 'to see why
plaintiff, an innocent third party, should bear the risk of the questionable
activities of another's agent. It was, after all, the defendant who selected Cash
as his agent and, at least vis-4-vis an innocent stranger should assume the risk
of his conduct. I s Had plaintiff not dealt with Cash as an agent, he could not have
claimed reliance on the agency; if that had been the case, and in the absence
of other facts, this might have been a stronger case for refusing to impute to
the defendant the knowledge of Cash because of the latter's adverse interests.' 9
MICHAEL SWART
CIVIL PROCEDURE-JuRISDICTIoN UNDER "ToRTIOUS ACT" PROVISION
OF NEW YORK LONG-ARm STATUTE OBTAINABLE OVER NON-RESIDENTS ONLY
WHEN SUCH ACTS ARE COMMITTED WITHIN THE STATE
In two recent cases New York residents brought suits on theories of negli-
gence and breach of warranty against non-domiciliary defendants involved in the
manufacture of products used in or sent into New York. Mr. and Mrs. Feathers,
plaintiffs in the first case, sued for personal injuries and property damage caused
17. Latty, Introduction to Business Associations 56 (1951).
18. Moore v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 55 N.Y. 41, 47 (1873).
19. This action commenced by Farr against Newman and Hardy appears to be the
only substantial basis for his remedy. Unfortunately, Newman left the jurisdiction. Though
it has been suggested in 9 Utah L. Rev. 496 (1964) that plaintiff might be able to recover
damages from the attorney on the theory of interference with contractual rights, this
would be a doubtful remedy in light of the court's statement that the attorney had not
acted fraudulently in considering the contract unenforceable. Defendant, on the other hand,
because of the agency relationship could possibly sue the attorney for a breach of that
relationship and stand a better chance of recovery than plaintiff would. The attorney appears
to have breached the ABA Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics 3 (Canon 6) (1957)
as well as general agency principles long accepted.
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by the explosion in New York of a steel tank of liquefied propane gas while it
was being hauled from Pennsylvania through New York to Vermont by a Penn-
sylvania interstate carrier. The tank had been manufactured in Kansas by
defendant-appellant Darby Corporation and sold to a Missouri corporation
which mounted it on a trailer and sold it to the carrier. Darby had no office,
representatives, agents or facilities in New York; it did not transact or solicit
any business within the state, but presumably knew that the tank was intended
for the Pennsylvania carrier and might be used in New York in the course of
the carrier's business. The only jurisdictional basis alleged by plaintiffs in the
complaint served on Darby in Kansas was that Darby had committed a
"tortious act" in New York within the meaning of New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules Section 302 (a) (2),' and was thereby subject to in personam juris-
diction. A motion by appellant to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdictional
basis 2 was granted at Special Term,3 but the order of dismissal was reversed by
the Appellate Division. 4 The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, held, the
order of the Appellate Division reversed and the Supreme Court order dismissing
the complaint reinstated. The court held that CPLR Section 302 (a) (2) does
not confer jurisdiction over defendants who have committed, outside New York,
acts which lead to harmful consequences in New York.
Michael Singer, plaintiff in the second action, was injured in Connecticut
while on a trip, when a geologist's hammer broke and a steel chip struck his eye.
The hammer, made and labeled "unbreakable" by defendant-appellant Estwing
in Illinois, was purchased and presented to the infant plaintiff in New York by an
aunt. The aunt obtained the hammer from one of several independent retail
stores in New York which handled appellant's merchandise, shipped to New
York in large quantities f.o.b. Illinois. Estwing solicited orders from such stores
by a manufacturer's representative in New York, by catalogues mailed into the
state, and by general public advertising here. A previous suit, brought prior to the
effective date of the CPLR, was dismissed since appellant was not "doing busi-
ness" in New York; that is, plaintiff could not show defendant's "presence with
'a fair degree of permanence and continuity,' ,"5 or that defendant conducted
"a substantial part of his main business here." O The new complaint, brought
under CPLR Section 302 was dismissed by the Court at Special Term7 on the
ground that appellant did not commit a tortious act within the state or transact
1. Hereinafter cited CPLR. See also 29A McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New YorkAnn. (pt. 3): New York Uniform Dist. Ct. Act, § 404(a) (1) ; New York City Civil Ct. Act,§ 404(a) (1).
2. As provided by CPLR § 3211(a) (8).
3. Feathers v. McLucas, 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
4. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964) (per
curiam).
5. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 261, 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917).6. Holzer v. Dodge Bros., 233 N.Y. 216, 221, 135 N.E. 268, 269 (1922). See also Brocia
v. Franklin Plan Corp., 235 A.D. 421, 257 N.Y.S. 167 (4th Dep't 1932).
7. Order entered in the office of the Clerk of the County of New York November 21,
1963, by Supreme Court judge Jacob Markowitz.
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any business within the state as required by that section. The Appellate Division8
reversed the order dismissing the complaint, holding that Estwing had committed
a tortious act in New York. On appeal the Court of Appeals held jurisdiction
does not exist under CPLR Section 302 (a) (2) (tortious act), as appellant
Estwing neither made nor mislabeled the hammer in New York; but in personam
jurisdiction may be asserted over appellant under CPLR Section 302 (a) (1),
since appellant did transact business in New York out of which plaintiff's cause of
action arose. The two cases, Feathers v. McLucas and Singer v. Walker, were
decided in a single opinion with a companion case, Longines-Wittnauer Co. v.
Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8
(1965). 9
The states have expanded their jurisdiction over nondomiciliary defendants
in response to the "invitation"' 0 of the United States Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington." In that case the Court interpreted the due
process clause to require only that such defendants "have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "112 Several states soon
enacted "long arm" or "single act" statutes'3 to avail themselves of the oppor-
tunities created by this interpretation of constitutional requirements. A mile-
stone' 4 was reached in 1956 when Illinois amended its Civil Practice Act so as
to subject-
8. Singer v. Walker, 21 A.D.2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964) (leave granted
to appeal, 21 A.D.2d 966).
9. The Longines-Wittnauer case proper involved the solicitation, negotiation, and per-
formance of services pursuant to a contract (along with the execution of a supplementary
contract) in New York by a foreign corporation. Jurisdiction was upheld over the foreign
corporation, in an action for breach of warranty by the New York firm, under the "transacts
any business" provision (CPLR § 302 (a) (1)). This case will not be further discussed herein.
In the Singer case, petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court on November 9, 1965, sub nom. Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Singer; Docket No. 473, 34 Law
Week 3159, 3160 (Nov. 9, 1965). See also American Cyanamid v. Rosenblatt, 16 N.Y.2d 621,
261 N.Y.S.2d 69, 209 N.E.2d 112 (1965) (memorandum); appeal pending in United States
Supreme Court, filed August 26, 1965; Docket No. 501, 34 Law Week 3081 (Sept. 14, 1965).
10. Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. Pub. L. 293 (1960).
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For an excellent history of the expansion of jurisdiction over
non-domiciliaries, see Note, Developments in the Law: State Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 909 (1960). See also Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants, 43 Minn. L.
Rev. 569 (1959); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting, in part,
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Compare Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), and dissenting opinion of four Justices in Traveler's Health Ass'n
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 655 (1949). Cf. Inglis, Jurisdiction, the Doctrine of Forum Con-
veniens, and Choice of Law in Conflict of Laws, 81 L.Q. Rev. 380 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Vermont Statutes 1947, § 1562 [now Vt. Stat. Ann., Title 12, § 855
(1958)1; Maryland Laws 1951, Art. 23, § 88 [now Md. Ann. Code, Art. 23, § 92B];
Minnesota Laws 1957, Ch. 538, § 1 [now Minn. Stat. Ann., § 303.13, subd. 1, par. 3 (1947)
(Supp. 1964)]; Texas Acts 1959, 56th Leg., p. 85, Ch. 43 [now Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.,
Art. 2031(b) (4) (Vernon 1964)] ; North Carolina Sess. Laws 1955, Ch. 1143, § 1371(1) [now
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-145 (1965)1; Washington Laws 1959, Ch. 131, § 2, p. 669 [now Wash.
Rev. Code Ann., § 4.28.185 (1962)].
14. O'Connor & Goff, Expanded Concepts of State Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents:
The Illinois Revised Civil Practice Act, 31 Notre Dame Law. 223 (1956).
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any person ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State ... as to
any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts: (a) The
transaction of any business within this State; (b) The commission of
a tortious act within this State .... r
The purpose of this statute is to permit the Illinois courts to exercise in personam
jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the International Shoe case.' The intent
of the legislature was, in the words of one authority,'T "to have the Illinois courts
occupy the constitutionally permissible field of state court jurisdiction far more
fully than has previously been done,"'8 by any other state. This was the effect
of the quoted language, since previous statutes applied only to foreign corpora-
tions.' Until this amendment went into effect, jurisdiction could be obtained in
Illinois only if a foreign corporation was "doing business" in the state.20
Many of the early Illinois decisions under the new statute reflected a recog-
nition that "transaction of any business" 2' required less by way of detailed or
continuous contacts than did "doing business.12 2 Still, there seems to be little
question that some act by the non-resident defendant in Illinois is required for
the exercise of jurisdiction under this new provision.2 3
The "tortious act" phrase2 4 has been the subject of considerable contro-
versy among courts2 5 and commentators2 6 over whether an act within the state
is required. A federal district court, interpreting the provision prior to any
15. Illinois Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 17(1) (1963).
16. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. Professor Edward Cleary, Univ. of Illinois; Reporter, Joint Committee on Illinois
Civil Procedure.
18. Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 599 (1955).
19. As opposed to individuals; Vermont Statutes 1947, § 1562 [now Vt. Stat, Ann.,
Title 12, § 855 (1958)]; Maryland Laws 1951, Art. 23, § 88 [now Md. Ann. Code, Art. 23,§ 92B (1957)]; North Carolina Sess. Laws 1955, Ch. 1143, § 1371(1) [now N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-145 (1965)].
20. See text accompanying notes 5, 6, supra.
21. Illinois Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1) (a) (1963).
22. See, e.g., National Gas Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 959 (1960); Walrus Manufacturing Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,
184 F. Supp. 214 (D.C. Ill. 1960); Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790(D.C. Il. 1958); Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (D.C. Ill. 1957); Nelson
v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 673 (1959); Berleman v. Superior Dist. Co., 17 Il1. App. 2d 522, 151
N.E.2d 401 (1958); Sunday v. Donovan, 16 Ill. App. 2d 116, 147 N.E.2d 401 (1958).
23. Orton v. Woods Oil & Gas, 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957); Grobark v. Addo
Machine Co., 11 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (as modified on a denial of rehearing) (1959);
Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569 (1962). See also, Hanson
v. Denclca, 327 U.S. 235 (1958); Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 198 F. Supp. 151(D.C.S.C. 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962); Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel
Prod., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963); Harrington v. Croft Steel Prod., 244
N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d 803 (1956).
24. Illinois Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (1963).
25. See the opinion of Chief judge Campbell in McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199
F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
26. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). For discussions generally approving the
result reached, see: Note, Civil Procedure: State Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Corporation,
23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 804 (1962); Note, Conflicts of Laws and Minimum Jurisdictional
Contacts, 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271 (1962). But see, Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations--Single Tortious Act, 36 Tul. L. Rev. 336 (1962); Note, 50 Geo. L.J. 310
(1961).
RECENT CASES
state decisions, held that an act (of negligence, etc.) within the state was
required, since the phrase "tortious act" comprised more than damage or injury
only.2 7 In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,28 the Illinois
Supreme Court took the opposite view, apparently asserting that an injury in
Illinois-the consequences of a negligent act elsewhere-is sufficient to satisfy
the statutory language. 29 The court later made reference to "a reasonable infer-
ence that [defendant's] commercial transactions ...result in substantial use
and consumption" 30 in Illinois. While this may have forestalled due process
criticism, it also obscured the precise ground of the decision,31 as it injects a
transaction of business tone into the discussion.32 This imprecisely answered
question-what a "tortious act within the state" is-has now been brought to
New York.
The State of New York adopted the language of the Illinois statute3 3 as
CPLR Section 302.34 Many of the early New York cases decided under the
tortious act provision3 5 sounded much like the Gray case; 3 6 that is, jurisdiction
was upheld over non-domiciliaries who committed foreign "tortlous acts" result-
ing in forum injuries. As in Gray37 the courts then found sufficient "contacts,
ties, or relations"3 8 with New York to satisfy due process requirements. The
27. Helliegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co, 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957). Accord, Put-
nam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957); Moss v. City of
Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961). See also Cosper v. Smith & Wesson
Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1956).
28. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
29. See Note, Torts-In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and Due
Process-A New Frontier, 11 DePaul L. Rev. 368, 372-73 (1961). Contra, McLaughlin,
Practice Commentary, 7B McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann. 428, 432
(1963).
30. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961).
31. See Thornton, First Judicial Interpretations of the New York Single Act Statute,
30 Brooklyn L. Rev. 285, 291-92 (1964).
32. The relevance of this assertion to a discussion of a "single tortious act" basis forjurisdiction is questionable, unless it is intended to reinforce the decision by suggesting that
the generic test of reasonableness is thereby satisfied. See McLaughlin, supra note 29, at
p. 433; Thornton, supra note 31, at 291.
33. New York, Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure [N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 13], p. 39. See note 15 supra and accompanying
text. The language of the New York statute is not identical, but only stylistic changes were
made.
34. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, § 302, effective September 1, 1963. For a thorough
discussion of the statute and the effect thereon of the instant cases, see Homburger, The
Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, supra p. 61.
35. Johnson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of the U.S., 43 Misc. 2d 850, 252 N.Y.S.2d
477 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Moss v. Frost Hempstead Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 357, 251 N.Y.S.2d 194
(Sup. Ct. 1964); Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49
(Sup. Ct. 1964); Fornabaio v. Swissair Transp. Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (all
containing dicta indicating Gray case ruling). Contra, Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d
104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964) where jurisdiction over foreign corporation was
denied, on the authority of Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill.
1957) (supra, note 27 and accompanying text). See generally, Weeks, Business Associations,
16 Syracuse L. Rev. 280 (1964).
36. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 fI1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
37. Ibid.
38. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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lower court opinions in the cases under review3 9 also seemed to forecast a broad
interpretation of the tortious act language. But the Court of Appeals has now
ended that trend.
The pre-CPLR basis of "doing business" 40 in New York as a means of
acquiring jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for any cause of action
(whether related to the business or not) has now been supplemented by CPLR
Section 302 (a) (1).41 By this provision, the New York Legislature intended "to
make non-domiciliaries doing acts within the state amenable to suit within the
state,"42 with regard to any cause of action arising 43 from those commercialL
acts.4 5 Most New York courts have applied the statute as it is commonly under-
stood: a "single act" provision. 46 These courts have found no impediment either
in the statutory language or the due process decisions to subjecting a defendant
to suit on the basis of a single transaction, saying, e.g., that CPLR Section
302 (a) (1) "apparently requires no continuity" 47 of contacts.48 The discussion
39. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964) (per
curiam); Singer vkWalker, 21 A.D.2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
40. See supra notes 5, 6, and accompanying text. See also, Comment, Transacting
Business as Jurisdictional Basis-A Survey of New York Case Law, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 525
(1965); Homburger, Book Review, New York Civil Practice, Weinstein, Korn, Miller, 112
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1222 (1964).
41. Providing that New York courts may exercise jurisdiction in personam over any
person who "transacts any business within the state ... ," but the cause of action must arise
out of that business. CPLR § 302 does not affect the pre-existing basis for jurisdiction; CPLR
§ 301 provides that "a court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status
as might have been exercised heretofore." See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d
426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
An unauthorized foreign corporation cannot be subjected to jurisdiction by service of
process on the Secretary of State (under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 307), despite its "trans-
action of business" in New York (CPLR § 302) ; if the corporation is not "doing business,"
service must be made in person under CPLR § 313. Railex Corp. v. White Mach. Co., 243
F. Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
42. New York, Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure [N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 131, p. 37.
43. CPLR § 302. See also note 41, supra. Nor may any other cause of action be
asserted against a defendant who is in New York to defend an action brought under
CPLR § 302, unless it also arises from one of the enumerated acts. CPLR § 302(b).
44. See Willis v. Willis, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1964) holding
that separation agreement is not "business" contemplated by the statute. See also Root v.
Root, 43 Misc. 2d 337, 250 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1964) holding substituted service im-
proper in matrimonial action brought under this provision.
45. For a thorough discussion of prior case law, see, Comment, Transacting Business as
Jurisdictional Basis-A Survey of New York Case Law, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 525 (1965).
46. See, e.g., Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245 N.Y.S.2d 545(Sup. Ct. 1964); Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 494 (Sup.
Ct. 1964) (both containing dicta to the effect that the making of a contract in New York,
without more, would be sufficient contact for exercise of jurisdiction). But see, Weeks,
Business Associations, 16 Syracuse L. Rev. 280 (1964), for a discussion of problems raised
by this assertion; see Homecrafts Inc. v. Gramercy Homes Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 591, 246
N.Y.S.2d 153 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Co. 1964).
47. Moss v. Frost Hempstead Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 357, 251 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (dicta). It is not enough, however, that goods on their way between two points
outside New York chance to pass through New York. Brunette Sunapee v. Zeolux Corp.,
288 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
48. There is dicta to the contrary: see, e.g., Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104,
247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (wherein it was said, ". . . use of the quoted words [any
business] connotes some consistent contacts or organized functions with or within the state."
[sic]), id. at 108, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
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herein does not relate to any large extent to the "transacts any business" provi-
sion. But since the Singer case turned on this part of the statute, it does deserve
mention at this point.
In deciding the instant cases, the Court of Appeals,49 per Judge Fuld, first
reaffirmed at considerable length its previously announced position that CPLR
Section 302 can be retroactively applied,50 citing several cases5 ' and quoting
CPLR Section 10003.52 Then focusing on the individual cases, the Court
reviewed the facts5 3 of Feathers as they relate to jurisdiction under CPLR Sec-
tion 302 (a) (2) .5 4 The only acts of negligence charged to appellant5 occurred in
Kansas,"6 but the Appellate Division sustained jurisdiction 57 by concluding that
"foreign wrongful acts"' 8 coupled with "resulting forum consequences"5 9 satisfied
the statutory language. The Appellate Division found due process requirements
satisfied by appellant Darby's "knowledge that the instant tank was constructed
for""0 the Pennsylvania firm, "intended for use in interstate commerce." 61 The
opinion continues, ". . . it is a fair inference that respondent, . . . could be
expected reasonably to foresee that its acts, if wrongful, might well have conse-
quences in adjoining New York." 62 The Appellate Division went on to suggest
that CPLR Section 302 was merely a codification of the minimum contacts test.6 3
The majority of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the reasoning and the
conclusions of the Appellate Division, asserting that the only question was not
what the legislature could or should have done, but whether it had in fact
"enacted legislation expanding the jurisdiction of our courts to the extent deter-
49. Chief Judge Desmond concurring in the result only in Singer v. Walker and
dissenting in Feathers v. McLucas in separate opinion; judge Van Voorhis concurring in
both cases and writing a separate opinion.
50. In actions brought for causes of action arising prior to the effective date of the
statute.
51. The Court relied in part on United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378
(1964); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Simonson v. Inter-
national Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). Accord, Teague
v. Damascus, 183 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Wash. 1960) (construing Washington statute copied
from Illinois). Contra, Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa 1031, 78 N.W.2d 6 (1956).
52. Providing, in part, "This act shall apply to all actions hereafter commenced . Y
53. S'upra, pp. 181-82.
54. As the Court notes, "There being no showing-indeed, not even a claim that the
appellant transacted any business in this State . . . , the case necessarily turns on
... paragraph 2." 15 N.Y.2d at 459, 209 N.E.2d at 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
55. Viz., faulty design and defective fabrication.
56. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Rienecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 459, 209
N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20; at any rate, they occurred outside New York.
57. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964).
58. Id. at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
59. Id. at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 550, citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), and Conklin v. Canadian-American
Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935). But see Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209
N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
60. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d 558, 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (3d Dep't 1964).
61. Id. at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
62. Id. at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
63. I.e., that the provisions were meant to establish the criteria for the exercise of
jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test. Id. at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
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mined by the Appellate Division .... "64 The Court decided that the Appellate
Division, in upholding jurisdiction, had gone beyond the limits prescribed by the
statute. The majority said that it would refuse to read the phrase "'commits a
tortious act within the state' . . . as if it were synonymous with 'commits a
tortious act without the state which causes injury within the state.' "15 The
Court explicitly denies the Appellate Division conclusion that "the acts com-
plained of can be said to have been committed in this State,"' 6 saying "the mere
occurrence of the injury in this State certainly cannot serve to transmute an out-
of-state tortious act into one committed here within the sense of the statutory
wording." 7 Considering "the plain language of the statute and the expressed
design of those who drafted it,"68 the majority thus interpreted the statute to
require that the non-domiciliary perform, while in New York, 0 some act to which
the injury may be attributed. 70 Since the appellant was never in New York, the
Court held there was no basis for jurisdiction. 71 The majority discussed but
refused to follow Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,72 as
they regarded it to have been decided on conflict of laws principles,73 and in dis-
regard of sound statutory construction. 71 To equate the terms "tort" and
"tortious act" as did the Illinois court in Gray70 is clearly a legislative function,
according to the Court. Furthermore, had the legislature so desired or intended,
there was no lack of models at hand which would have accomplished this result.70
In Singer the Court set out the facts relating to the tortious act ground for
jurisdiction. 77 The interpretation of the statute announced in Feathers compelled
64. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 460, 209 N.E.2d
at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21.
65. Id. at 459-60, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21.
66. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 A.D.2d at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (3d Dep't 1964).
67. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 460, 209 N.E.2d
at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21. But see Ellis v. Newton Paper Co., 44 Misc. 2d 134, 253 N.Y.S.2d
47 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
68. Id. at 460, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
69. This would seem to re-open the question of whether jurisdiction may be obtained
in a stockholders' suit against non-resident directors for neglect of corporate duties. It
seems difficult to say that acts of omission are committed in any particular place, unless it
is where the acts should be performed; but the directors are not there in most cases. See
Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 599, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See also Barnes
v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Imberman v. Alexander, 16 Misc. 2d 330, 184
N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Mannheim Dairy Co. v. Little Falls Nat'l Bank, 54
N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
70. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 464, 209 NE.2d
at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
71. Id. at 464, 209 N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24.
72. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
73. The Illinois court recited the familiar principle of conflict of laws that "the
place of the wrong is where the last event takes place that is necessary to render the actor
liable." Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 435, 176
N.E.2d 761, 762 (1961). See also Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 377, n.1 (1934).
74. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 463, 209 N.E.2d
at 79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
75. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
76. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 461-62, 209
N.E.2d at 78, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
77. Id. at 464-65, 209 N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25; petition for certiorari was
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the conclusion that appellant was not subject to jurisdiction here under CPLR
Section 302(a)(2). "The tortious conduct . .. consists solely of its acts in
manufacturing an assertedly defective hammer and in attaching to it a false
label, both of which unquestionably took place in Illinois."7 8 The conclusion of
the Appellate Division that the putting into circulation in New York of a defec-
tively made and mislabeled hammer was a new and independent in-state1 9
tortious act of "creating ... a continuing condition of hazard"80 was rejected
by the majority. Jurisdiction will not lie under CPLR Section 302 (a) (2) in the
absence of a tortious act by appellant within the forum.8
Jurisdiction was however upheld in this case under the transaction of busi-
ness provision.8 2 Pointing out that CPLR Section 302 (a) (1) "is not limited to
actions in contract; it applies as well to actions in tort when supported by a
sufficient showing of facts,"83 the Court discussed appellant's other contacts
with New York. The Court noted that, in addition to the solicitation activities
mentioned previously, appellant had shipped substantial quantities of its goods
here and that the presence in New York of the fateful hammer was traceable to
appellant's solicitation.8 4 These facts were held "to satisfy [both] the statutory
criterion of transaction of business"8 5 and the "minimum contacts" due process
test.80 Since the cause of action arose from the transaction of the business,
jurisdiction is sustained.
Chief Judge Desmond concurred in the result in Singer, but strongly took
issue with the majority decision that CPLR Section 302 (a) (2) does not confer
jurisdiction in both cases.87 Characterizing the interpretation of the majority as
"restrictive," 88 the Chief Judge cited several similar statutes 9 and cases con-
struing them to show that "tortious act" means "part of a tort." The tort here
charged involves three parts, he asserts: manufacture, distribution, and injury.
denied by the United States Supreme Court on November 9, 1965, sub nom. Estwing Mfg.
Co. v. Singer; Docket No. 473, 34 Law Week 3159, 3160 (Nov. 9, 1965).
78. Id. at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
79. Id. at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
80. Singer v. Walker, 21 A.D.2d 285, 289, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (1st Dep't 1964)
referred to in quoted language, Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
81. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 466, 209 N.E.2d
at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
82. Id. at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
83. Id. at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
84. Id. at 466, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26. For similar result under analogous
Alabama statute, see Boyd v. Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 687, 49 So. 559 (1950).
See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Note, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 569, esp. 576(1963).
85. Id. at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
86. Id. at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
87. Id. at 470, 472, 209 N.E.2d at 83, 85, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 29, 31.
88. Id. at 470, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 29. Cf. Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Note, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 78
(1963) ; applying "grouping of contacts" test in favor of New York resident injured in On-
tario auto accident.
89. In addition to the statutes cited supra note 13, the Chief Judge cites Connecticut
Gen. Stat. Rev. § 33-411(c) (1959) and West Virginia Code Ann. § 3083 (1961).
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By sending the hammer into New York, the appellant committed part of the
tort.9 0 And this to the Chief Judge is synonymous with "tortious act." 1 Chief
Judge Desmond relies in part on Gray0 2 in so construing CPLR Section 302 (a)
(2), and justified his reliance by saying, "When our Legislature adopted the lan-
guage of the Illinois Legislature it presumably adopted with it the construction
given the statutory language by the Illinois courts in Gray ... 2*3 The Chief
Judge also voted to affirm the finding of jurisdiction in Feathers"4 on the same
basis: that when appellant's "conduct of his business is such that he contemplates
the delivery of his product in a forum state he is guilty of a tortious act in the
forum state if the product is defective in such manner that the manufacturer is
liable in tort." 95
It can hardly be disputed that the words "act within the State,"00 if taken
literally, strongly suggest the construction given them by the Court of Appeals.07
But there are several grounds for arguing that this construction is neither dictated
by the language nor by the policy considerations underlying its enactment. First,
the expansion of jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries has long since passed the
point allowed by this interpretation. 8 This does not mean that the legislature
necessarily intended to confer jurisdiction beyond the limits now imposed; it
does suggest that precedent existed, and that the Court might have construed
the language in keeping with the powers asserted by other states.0 0 Had the
majority entertained doubts about the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction
90. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 471, 209 N.E.2d
at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
91. Id. at 471, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
92. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 InI. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
93. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 471, 209 N.E.2d
at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
94. Id. at 472, 209 N.E.2d at 85, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
95. Id. at 471, 209 N.E.2d at 84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30. See McLaughlin, Civil Practice,
16 Syracuse L. Rev. 419, esp. 434 (1964).
96. CPLR § 302(a) (2).
97. See text accompanying note 67, supra. Cf. State v. Associated Building Contractors
of Triple Cities, Inc., 47 Misc. 2d 699, 263 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (relying on a "careful
reading" of CPLR § 302 to deny jurisdiction over individual defendant who was New York
resident when acts were committed, but a resident of Ohio when papers were served on him
in the latter state). See also McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentary, 7B McKin-
ney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann. 19, 22 (1964 Cum. Supp.). Contra, O'Connor v.
Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
98. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963); Weinstein,
Trends in Civil Practice, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1A. "Easier Acquisition of Jurisdiction,"
at 1435 (1962)
99. One anomalous result of these decisions is illustrated by the following example:
Suppose a New York firm and an Illinois firm make identically defective widgets. Each
widget travels through the hands of several intermediaries and finally arrives (as have many
of its predecessors) in the other's state, where its manufacturer does not transact any busi-
ness directly. When the respective purchasers are injured, both suits will probably be brought
in Illinois, despite the fact that the jurisdictional statutes of both states are substantively
identical. By these decisions New York has foregone jurisdiction over the Illinois manu-
facturer.
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in the cases under review, it is doubtful that they would advance statutes which
purport to do so as alternatives available to the legislature. 100
Secondly, it is a settled rule of statutory construction that the legislature
of the state adopting a statute from a foreign jurisdiction "is presumed to have
adopted the construction which has been put on the statute by the courts of the
state of its inception."''1 1 That construction, announced by the Illinois court in
Gray'0 2 in 1961, would probably permit the exercise of jurisdiction in the
Feathers case. 0 3 Had the legislature wished to avoid this result, it could have
changed the language of the statute or added a caveat to restrict the statute as it
saw fit, before its passage in 1962.104 It is curious that this rule of construction
is not mentioned in the majority opinion; L0 5 the Illinois interpretation was
treated as having no special significance, when it should have been given "great
weight"' 06 in construing the New York statute. And since "tortious act within
the State" 0 7 could be considered a term of art, the Court need not have felt
impelled to give the words such a literal treatment.
Thirdly, while the legislative history is so brief as to be of little assistance
in interpreting the statute, it does not compel the result reached by the Court,
and may even suggest the opposite result. The basic premise of the draftsmen (as
100. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 461-62, 209
N.E.d at 77-79, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22. "Long-arm" or "single-act" statutes of various types
have been upheld against constitutional challenges: See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l
City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1964); McGee v. International Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965); Simonson v. International
Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 247, 251 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1964); Smyth v. Twin State Im-
provement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Il. 2d 278, 143
N.E.2d 673 (1959). It must be borne in mind that extreme applications of these states may,
however, violate due process: See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Erlanger
Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Lone Star Motor
Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Texas 1960) (unconstitutional
in part) (But see Hearne v. Dow-Badiscbe Chem. Corp., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Texas 1963),
upholding similar application of Texas statute.). Cf. Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 A.D. 903,
120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1953).
101. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 5209, pp. 551-52 (1945). See also
lacone v. Cardillo, 208 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1953); Great Northern Tel. Co. v. Yokahama
Specie Bank, 297 N.Y. 135, 76 N.E.2d 117 (1947); 1 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York Ann., Statutes §§ 261-62, pp. 314-19 (1942). The adopting state may refuse
to follow the precedent if it finds the decision to be poorly reasoned, contrary to the
purpose of the statute, or offensive to settled forum policy.
102. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
103. There is not much question that the Gray rationale would permit the exercise of
jurisdiction over the appellant in Feathers. The language of the Gray decision does not
rule out the same result in Singer, despite the fact that the injury occurred in Connecticut,
since the appellant had sufficient contacts with New York to make it reasonable for it to
defend here. See McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, 7B McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York Ann., at 432 (1942).
104. Approved by the Governor April 4, 1962; effective September 1, 1963.
105. The reason given by the majority for considering the Gray case was "the emphasis
given the decision by the appellants ... " 15 N.Y.2d at 462, 209 N.E.2d at 79, 261
N.Y.S.2d at 23.
106. 1 McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., § 262, pp. 317-18 (1942).
See also Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 559, 609 (1955).
107. CPLR § 302(a)(2).
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set out in the Second Preliminary Report) was stated to be "that persons in the
state should be permitted to protect their interests by resort to the courts of the
state."'' 08 Furthermore, one of the objectives was "to make it possible, with very
limited exceptions, for a litigant in the New York courts to take full advantage
of the state's constitutional power over persons and things."' 0 9 The advisory
committee apparently anticipated some latitude being left to the courts, since it
was noted that the proposed statute (the present CPLR Section 302) did not
define jurisdiction directly, but left that to the case law.110 Thus it appears that
the "expressed design of those who drafted""' CPLR Section 302 was to broaden
jurisdiction beyond the limits now imposed.
Moreover, the advisory committee chose to reprint the practice notes'1 2 to
the Illinois statute, which include the assertion that the scope of Illinois Civil
Practice Act Section 17113 is equivalent to that of the Vermont and the Maryland
statutes, with regard to tortious acts." 4 Since the New York draftsmen do not, in
their own comments, disagree with or criticize this assertion, it might be inferred
that they accepted this supposition. Thus assuming the Vermont and Maryland
statutes would be broad enough to confer jurisdiction in the instant cases, as the
Court suggests," 5 the legislative history can be read to mean that the New
York statute does likewise. This argument lends further weight to Chief Judge
Desmond's assertion'" that "tortious act" means "part of a tort,""17 since the
Vermont statute"18 extends to "a tort in whole or in part" within the state, and
the Maryland statute"19 to "acts giving rise to liability in the state."
Finally, the application of a jurisdictional statute must balance the interests
of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court. 20 To the extent that the interests
of the parties are safeguarded elsewhere, they need less emphasis in deciding
whether or not to exercise jurisdiction in any given case. The oppressed plaintiff
108. New York, Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice
and Procedure [N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 131, p. 37.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Fuld, J., writing for the majority in Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 560, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 21. See also text
accompanying notes 68-70, supra.
112. Jenner & Tone, Historical and Practice Notes, Illinois Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-
Hurd 1956), pp. 165-171; New York, Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee
on Practice and Procedure [N.Y. Legis. Doc. 1958, No. 13], pp. 471-78.
113. Illinois Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 17 (1963).
114. Jenner & Tone, op. cit. supra, at 168; reprinted at 474-75 of the New York work
cited.
115. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d at 461-62, 209
N.E.2d at 77-78, '261 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
116. Longines-Wittnauer Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 471, 209 N.E.2d at
84, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
117. See text accompanying notes 89-91, supra.
118. Vermont Stat. Ann., Title 12, § 855 (1958). See, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem, 319 F.2d
124 (2d Cir. 1963); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664
(1951).
119. Maryland Ann. Code, Art. 23, § 92B (1957). See, e.g., Gkiafis v. Steamship
Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965); White v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 235 Md. 368,
201 A.2d 856 (1964).
120. Weinstein, op. cit. supra note 98, at 435.
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may be able to obtain relief by removal to, and change of venue in the Federal
courts.' 2 1 The specter of remaining due process restrictions should not be too
quickly invoked to make the plaintiff's task unreasonably difficult or expensive.'
22
It must be remembered that there is a point at which the denial of a nearby
forum to the injured plaintiff is offensive to "traditional concepts of fair play
and substantial justice."' 23  DOUGLAS C. DODGE
COMMERCIAL LAW-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE--DRAwER-
BANK OF TELLER'S CHECK CANNOT STOP PAYMENT WHEN NOT PARTY TO
UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
Carole Kuebler purchased a teller's check from the drawer Savings Bank.
The check was in the sum of $450 payable to the order of payee Malphrus and
drawn on the Commercial Bank. Payee Malphrus received the check in part
payment for an automobile delivered to Miss Kuebler. Drawer Savings Bank
stopped payment on its teller's check upon the request of Miss Kuebler. When
payee Malphrus presented the check to the Commercial Bank, payment was
refused due to drawer Savings Bank's stop order. Payee Malphrus sued the
drawer Savings Bank for the amount of the check. The court held that where a
bank issued a teller's check payable to a seller and received consideration for the
check from the buyer, the check was considered a certified check and payment
could not be stopped by the bank. Malphrus v. Home Savings Bank, 44 Misc. 2d
705, 254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965).
Generally, an ordinary check is taken as conditional payment of an under-
lying obligation.' It does not operate as an assignment of funds in the hands of
a drawee bank available for its payment, and the drawee bank is not liable on a
check until accepted.2 A drawer of a check is not discharged on an underlying
debt until a seller or creditor presents a check to a drawee bank and the check
is accepted 3 or paid.4 Since delivery of an ordinary check does not constitute
absolute payment nor discharge of a drawer, a drawer may stop payment on the
check.5 Payment may be stopped for any valid reason' if timely notice is given
121. Assuming requisite jurisdictional amount is involved; see 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441,
1404(a), 1406(a). In light of the typical injuries in the cases involved herein, this assump-
tion seems warranted.
122. See Jesmer, Recent Decisions Affecting § 17, 48 I1. Bar Jour. 132 (1959).
123. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ; quoted with approval in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
1. See Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N.Y. 19, 27 N.E. 763 (1891); Burkhalter v. Second Nat'l
Bank, 42 N.Y. 538 (1870); 1 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions 1091 (1940).
2. N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter referred to as U.C.C.) § 3-409(1).
3. "Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the draft as presented." N.Y.
U.C.C. § 3-410(1).
4. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 4-213(1) for determination of when an item is finally paid.
5. Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S. 385, 391 (1888); see Glennan v. Rochester
Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 16, 102 N.E. 537, 539 (1913).
6. Generally, payment is stopped because of fraud or failure of consideration in the
